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Recent evidence highlights the importance of social norms in many economic relations. However, many of these relationships are long-term and provide repeated game incentives for performance. We experimentally investigate interaction effects of reciprocity and repeated game incentives in two...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011398911
Reputation is a commonly cited check on opportunism in economic and social interactions. But it is often unclear what …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011333021
not affect the winning strategy. Further considering the effects of reputation and structure, I find that they act …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011316592
remains unclear. In each of six treatments that vary the cooperation premium and the informational basis for reputation … forces of (a) learning about the benefits of reputation, and (b) learning about backward unraveling. We find, inter alia …, that with a high cooperation premium and good information, investment in reputation grows across sets of finitely …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010126752
equilibria share some features with the ones of multi-sided reputation models. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010256693
Interactions between players with private information and opposed interests are often prone to bad advice and inefficient outcomes, e.g. markets for financial or health care services. In a deception game we investigate experimentally which factors could improve advice quality. Besides advisor...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011530053
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011546793
We consider an infinitely repeated game in which a privately informed, long-lived manager raises funds from short-lived investors in order to finance a project. The manager can signal project quality to investors by making a (possibly costly) forward-looking disclosure about her project's...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011506852
Building on the seminal paper of Ordover, Saloner and Salop (1990), I study the role of reputation building on … foreclosure in laboratory experiments. In one-shot interactions, upstream firms can choose to build a reputation by revealing … their price history to the current upstream competitor. In particular, integrated firms can establish a reputation to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011555141
We develop and estimate a general equilibrium model to quantitatively assess the effects and welfare implications of central bank transparency. Monetary policy can deviate from active inflation stabilization and agents conduct Bayesian learning about the nature of these deviations. Under...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011560575