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Recent evidence highlights the importance of social norms in many economic relations. However, many of these relationships are long-term and provide repeated game incentives for performance. We experimentally investigate interaction effects of reciprocity and repeated game incentives in two...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011398911
Reputation is a commonly cited check on opportunism in economic and social interactions. But it is often unclear what …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011333021
not affect the winning strategy. Further considering the effects of reputation and structure, I find that they act …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011316592
remains unclear. In each of six treatments that vary the cooperation premium and the informational basis for reputation … forces of (a) learning about the benefits of reputation, and (b) learning about backward unraveling. We find, inter alia …, that with a high cooperation premium and good information, investment in reputation grows across sets of finitely …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010126752
equilibria share some features with the ones of multi-sided reputation models. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010256693
We suggest a model of electoral competition between two parties which is extended by a third player : mass media. The classical one-dimensional competition model is changed by introducing an issue-specific sensibility-coefficient and by allowing for non-voting. The winner is selected by majority...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011441433
Interactions between players with private information and opposed interests are often prone to bad advice and inefficient outcomes, e.g. markets for financial or health care services. In a deception game we investigate experimentally which factors could improve advice quality. Besides advisor...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011530053
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011546793
We consider an infinitely repeated game in which a privately informed, long-lived manager raises funds from short-lived investors in order to finance a project. The manager can signal project quality to investors by making a (possibly costly) forward-looking disclosure about her project's...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011506852
Building on the seminal paper of Ordover, Saloner and Salop (1990), I study the role of reputation building on … foreclosure in laboratory experiments. In one-shot interactions, upstream firms can choose to build a reputation by revealing … their price history to the current upstream competitor. In particular, integrated firms can establish a reputation to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011555141