We present a new and simple mechanism for repeated public good environments. In the Conditional Contribution Mechanism … contributed." This mechanism offers agents risk-free strategies, which we call unexploitable. We prove that if agents choose … Contribution Mechanism show that the CCM leads to significantly higher contribution rates. Even under incomplete information …

use a mechanism design approach to solve for the optimal utilitarian provision rule. The relevant incentive constraints …

priori unknown. The analysis is based on a mechanism design approach that imposes a requirement of robustness with respect to …

mechanism of d'Aspremont and Gérard-Varet is shown to implement an effi cient provision rule with budget balance. However, first … mechanism is independent of the stochastic specification within the class of specifications defined by the structure of the …-Groves mechanism converges to zero in probability when the number of participants becomes large. In the limit, with a continuum of …

mechanism of d’Aspremont and Gérard-Varet is shown to implement an efficient provision rule with budget balance. However, first … mechanism is independent of the stochastic specification within the class of specifications defined by the structure of the …-Groves mechanism converges to zero in probability when the number of participants becomes large. In the limit, with a continuum of …

form a reasonable set of predictions for mechanism selection in public goods problems; such predictions are sufficiently …