This research rejects the conventional story, that strong CEO's take advantage of shareholders by co-opting the Board of Directors. Shareholder voting at the AGM of large public companies, at least in companies without a concentrated ownership, support the pay arrangements that come out of a...

Extensive discussions of the inefficiencies of "short-termism" in executive compensation notwithstanding, very little is known empirically about the extent of such short-termism. This paper develops a novel measure of executive pay duration that reflects the vesting periods of different pay...

The average publicly-traded firm pays its CEO millions of dollars in deferred compensation and defined-benefit pension commitments. Scholars debate whether firms use these payments to efficiently align managerial interests with those of creditors, or whether instead they represent “hidden”...

This paper explores the legislative history of executive compensation, starting with Depression-era disclosure regulations and ending with the ongoing implementation of the Dodd-Frank Act. Over the past 80 years, Congress has imposed tax policies, accounting rules, disclosure requirements,...

We examine how managerial incentives affect acquisition decisions in the banking industry. We find that higher pay-for-performance sensitivity (PPS) leads to value-enhancing acquisitions. Banks whose CEOs have higher PPS have significantly better abnormal stock returns around the acquisition...

Kato & Long (2005) state that executive compensation has attracted much attention from economists in the past two decades yet most academic work on executive compensation has been concentrated on a few developed countries such as the U.S. and the U.K., mainly due to data availability. In light...

This paper studies the effects on income distribution caused by changes in the fraction of wages paid at the start of a production program, when the remaining wage is paid at the end. Among other results, it is found that this fraction permits the definition of certain restrictions affecting the...

This paper examines the two-way relationship between managerial compensation and corporate risk by exploiting an unanticipated change in firms' business risks. The natural experiment provides an opportunity to examine two classic questions related to incentives and risk — how boards adjust...

Companies can increase executive compensation by allowing dividends to be paid on unvested restricted stocks grants, also known as stealth compensation. Examining all S&P 500 firms over the period 2003-2007, we find that more than half of the dividend paying firms allow this practice. We look at...

For the past six years, the CEOs of firms in copyright-intensive industries received significantly higher compensation than the CEOs of the firms in the other industries we used for comparison (construction, transportation, and mining). For example, in 2012, copyright-intensive industry CEOs...