We construct preferences towards risk and uncertainty as reflected in the cultural heritage of CEOs managing public firms in the U.S. We demonstrate that auditors take into account cultural traits of CEOs in the pricing of their audit services. We also show CEO cultural heritage is associated...

We examine whether CEO extraversion, an important personality trait associated with leadership, affects firms' expected cost of equity capital. We measure CEO extraversion using CEOs' speech patterns during the unscripted portion of conference calls. After controlling for several CEO and firm...

We propose a framework that advances our understanding of CEO retention decisions in misreporting firms. Consistent with economic intuition, outside directors are more likely to fire (retain) CEOs when retention (replacement) costs are high relative to replacement (retention) costs. When the...

We show that large public companies in the United States change the assumptions of the benefit formulas of the defined benefits pension plans for their top executives in anticipation of plan freezes and executive retirements. In particular, on average top executives receive a boost in annual...

We provide evidence that outside directors’ trading and ratification decisions are incrementally useful in assessing their independence. Because crises test the independence of boards, we first investigate the CEO replacement decision in firms caught intentionally misreporting earnings. We...

I examine how the debt covenant structure of a firm varies with managerial risk-taking incentives via CEO compensation sensitivities to stock return volatility (Vega). I build a comprehensive firm debt covenant index by including both public and private debt issues. I find a robust negative...

This paper investigates the impact of managerial compensation on the likelihood of covenant violations and reports that higher CEO risk-shifting incentives significantly increase the likelihood of covenant violations. Evidence suggests that CEOs with creditor unfriendly compensation in leveraged...

Using the SEC regulations (following the Sarbanes–Oxley Act) on board independence as an identification for externally imposed governance changes, I compare its influence on firm performance to the effect of voluntarily conducted adjustments. Controlling for companies with voluntary changes,...