Similar Search Results

How important is moral hazard for distressed banks?

Ben-David, Itzhak; Palvia, Ajay; Stulz, René M. - 2020

The moral hazard incentives of the bank safety net predict that distressed banks take on more risk and higher leverage …. Since many factors reduce these incentives, including charter value, regulation, and managerial incentives, the net economic … effect of these incentives is an empirical question. We provide evidence on this question using two distinct periods that …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012216705

On the optimal design of a financial stability fund

Ábrahám, Árpád; Cárceles-Poveda, Eva; Liu, Yan; … - 2022

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013365773

On the optimal design of a financial stability fund

Ábrahám, Árpád; Cárceles-Poveda, Eva; Liu, Yan; … - 2022

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013359200

Securization and banks' capital structure

Almazan, Andres; Martín Oliver, Alfredo; Saurina, Jesús - 2015

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011795921

Caught between Scylla and Charybdis? Regulating bank leverage when there is rent seeking and risk shifting

Acharya, Viral V.; Mehran, Hamid; Thakor, Anjan - 2010

Banks face two different kinds of moral hazard problems: asset substitution by shareholders (e.g., making risky, negative net present value loans) and managerial rent seeking (e.g., investing in inefficient 'pet' projects and consuming perquisites that yield private benefits). The privately...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010287043

Moral hazard and capital structure dynamics

Dewatripont, Mathias; Legros, Patrick; Matthews, Steven A. - 2002

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001681302

Caught between Scylla and Charybdis? : regulating bank leverage when there is rent seeking and risk shifting

Acharya, Viral V.; Mehran, Hamid; Thakor, Anjan V. - 2010 - Rev.

Banks face two different kinds of moral hazard problems: asset substitution by shareholders (e.g., making risky, negative net present value loans) and managerial rent seeking (e.g., investing in inefficient “pet” projects and consuming perquisites that yield private benefits). The privately...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008657183

Caught between Scylla and Charybdis? : regulating bank leverage when there is rent seeking and risk shifting

Acharya, Viral V.; Mehran, Hamid; Thakor, Anjan V. - 2010

Banks face two moral hazard problems: asset substitution by shareholders (e.g., making risky, negative net present value loans) and managerial rent seeking (e.g., investing in inefficient “pet” projects or simply being lazy and uninnovative). The privately optimal level of bank leverage is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008826858

Limited liability and option contracts in models with sequential investments

Lülfesmann, Christoph - 2001

The paper investigates a model where two parties sequentially invest in a joint project (an asset). Investments and the project value are unverifiable, and A is wealth constrained so that an initial outlay must be financed by either agent B or an external investor C, say a bank. We show that an...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011538898

Back to the future : the nature of regulatory capital requirements

Chami, Ralph; Cosimano, Thomas F.; Kopp, E.; Rochon, Céline - 2017

This paper compares the current regulatory capital requirements under the Dodd-Frank Act (DFA) and the 10-percent leverage ratio, as proposed by the U.S. Treasury and the U.S. House of Representatives' Financial CHOICE Act (FCA). We find that the majority of U.S. banks would not qualify for an...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011799690