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We ask whether the correlation between mortgage leverage and default is due to moral hazard (the causal effect of leverage) or adverse selection (ex-ante risky borrowers choosing larger loans). We separate these information asymmetries using a natural experiment resulting from (i) the unique...
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The moral hazard incentives of the bank safety net predict that distressed banks take on more risk and higher leverage …. Since many factors reduce these incentives, including charter value, regulation, and managerial incentives, the net economic … effect of these incentives is an empirical question. We provide evidence on this question using two distinct periods that …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012216705
In order to identify the relevant sources of firms' financing constraints, we ask what financial frictions matter for corporate policies. To that end, we build, solve, and estimate a range of dynamic models of corporate investment and financing, embedding a host of financial frictions. We focus...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011976900
This paper presents evidence that firms choose conservative financial policies partly to mitigate workers' exposure to unemployment risk. We exploit changes in state unemployment insurance laws as a source of variation in the costs borne by workers during layoff spells. We find that higher...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012940594
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Banks face two different kinds of moral hazard problems: asset substitution by shareholders (e.g., making risky, negative net present value loans) and managerial rent seeking (e.g., investing in inefficient 'pet' projects and consuming perquisites that yield private benefits). The privately...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010287043
Banks face two moral hazard problems: asset substitution by shareholders (e.g., making risky, negative net present value loans) and managerial rent seeking (e.g., investing in inefficient “pet” projects or simply being lazy and uninnovative). The privately optimal level of bank leverage is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008826858
Banks face two different kinds of moral hazard problems: asset substitution by shareholders (e.g., making risky, negative net present value loans) and managerial rent seeking (e.g., investing in inefficient “pet” projects and consuming perquisites that yield private benefits). The privately...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008657183
expected losses for its depositors. I show that implicit guarantees increase the incentives of the bank to enhance leverage and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010338928