Showing 1 - 10 of 3,956
rationality behaviour by people. Quite recent developments in the Economics of Knowledge, i.e. the so-called learning models, have …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011502970
This discussion paper led to a publication in the 'European Economic Review' (2013). Vol. 61, pp. 186-204.<P> Rational Expectations (RE) models have two crucial dimensions: 1) agents correctly forecast future prices given all available information, and 2) given expectations, agents solve...</p>
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256912
different cognitive abilities learn differently, we estimate a structural model of learning based on level-k reasoning. We find …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011259076
rationality behaviour by people. Quite recent developments in the Economics of Knowledge, i.e. the so-called learning models, have …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011500007
Rational Expectations (RE) models have two crucial dimensions: 1) agents correctly forecast future prices given all available information, and 2) given expectations, agents solve optimization problems and these solutions in turn determine actual price realizations. Experimental testing of such...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010326375
rationality behaviour by people. Quite recent developments in the Economics of Knowledge, i.e. the so-called learning models, have …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005398696
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010191021
This paper introduces a model of boundedly rational observational learning, which is rationally founded and applicable …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013027986
understand better how subjects with different cognitive abilities learn differently, we estimate a structural model of learning … ability to that of character skills, and find that both cognition and personality affect behavior and learning. More agreeable …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010364492
Using belief elicitation, the paper investigates the formation and the evolution of beliefs in a signalling game in which a common prior on Sender's type is not induced. Beliefs are elicited about the type of the Sender and about the strategies of the players. The experimental subjects often...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009535526