substitutability than it really has. This is so either because managers are biased and perceive the good in this way, or because firms …

still benefits from the increase in the merged firm's total value. Moreover, given that the managers are compensated … according to an identical linear incentive scheme, the optimal shareholder policy always entails a corner solution. Managers …

assign a non-profit-maximization objective to their managers. Consequently, managers in a delegation game invest more in cost …

assign a non-profit-maximization objective to their managers. Consequently, managers in a delegation game invest more in cost …

combination of profits and sales as incentives for their managers. On the second stage, the two managers compete in a tournament …This paper considers a two-stage game with two owners and two managers. On the first stage, the owners choose a linear … against each other. In a symmetric equilibrium, both owners induce their managers to maximize profits. In asymmetric …

profitable for owners to hire biased managers. Our work shows that a universal policy that effectively eliminates such biases …