assign a non-profit-maximization objective to their managers. Consequently, managers in a delegation game invest more in cost …

assign a non-profit-maximization objective to their managers. Consequently, managers in a delegation game invest more in cost …

combination of profits and sales as incentives for their managers. On the second stage, the two managers compete in a tournament …This paper considers a two-stage game with two owners and two managers. On the first stage, the owners choose a linear … against each other. In a symmetric equilibrium, both owners induce their managers to maximize profits. In asymmetric …

the unverifiability problem of labor contracts. Under a zero-profit condition, both tournament types will yield first … all the bargaining power. However, if workers are rik averse or one worker has a lead a J-type tournament may dominate a U …-type tournament. …

We propose a novel tournament design that incorporates the main properties of a round-robin tournament, a Swiss … tournament, and a race. Following an equilibrium analysis, we compare 36 tournament structures inherent in our model and several … well-known tournament models from the literature, on the basis of expected total equilibrium effort. We show that two of …

abilities. This, in turn, has adverse consequences for who might want to participate in a tournament. Since better contestants … anticipate that they will be sabotaged more strongly, it may happen that the most able stay out and the tournament selects one of …

We develop a product market theory that explains why firms invest in general training of their workers. We consider a …

characterizes the conditions for which, under Cournot oligopoly, existing firms behave more collusively than in a standard Cournot …