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Managers of public water companies present themselves and are seen as public servants maximizing public welfare. Because water is rarely allocated through market mechanisms, this maximization requires that managers cooperate in a bureaucratic version of a social dilemma. Members of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013115012
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The purpose of this paper is to model the influence of Kantian moral scruples in a dynamic environment. Our objectives are two-fold. Firstly, we investigate how a Nash equilibrium among agents who have moral scruples may ensure that the exploitation of a common property renewable resource is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012119755
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We examine a game of harvesting a renewable common resource and investigate the ramifications of competition. We formulate the problem as an impulse control game between two competing harvesters and devise a new formulation of closed-loop impulse control strategies. In the case of non-zero setup...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014077474
For a country fractionalized in competing factions, each owning part of the stock of natural exhaustible resources, or with insecure property rights, we analyze how resources are transformed into productive capital to sustain consumption. We allow property rights to improve as the country...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003942714
For a country fractionalized in competing factions, each owning part of the stock of natural exhaustible resources, or with insecure property rights, we analyze how resources are transformed into productive capital to sustain consumption. We allow property rights to improve as the country...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013095003
Water markets with market power are analysed as multi-market Cournot competition in which the river structure constrains access to local markets and limited resources impose capacity constraints. Conditions for uniqueness are identified. Lerner indices are larger under binding resource...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011380731
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003086502
The objective of this paper is to investigate the usefulness of non-cooperative bargaining theory for the analysis of negotiations on water allocation and management. We explore the impacts of different economic incentives, a stochastic environment and varying individual preferences on players'...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013316631