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Optimal Income Taxation and Public Goods Provision in a Large Economy with Aggregate Uncertainty

Bierbrauer, Felix - 2009

priori unknown. The analysis is based on a mechanism design approach that imposes a requirement of robustness with respect to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013158141

Public-good provision with macro uncertainty about preferences : efficiency, budget balance, and robustness

Hellwig, Martin - 2021

mechanism of d'Aspremont and Gérard-Varet is shown to implement an effi cient provision rule with budget balance. However, first … mechanism is independent of the stochastic specification within the class of specifications defined by the structure of the …-Groves mechanism converges to zero in probability when the number of participants becomes large. In the limit, with a continuum of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012657865

Imperfect Public Monitoring with Costly Punishment - An Experimental Study

Ambrus, Attila - 2011

This paper experimentally investigates the effects of a costly punishment option on cooperation and social welfare in long finitely repeated public good contribution games. In a perfect monitoring environment increasing the severity of the potential punishment monotonically increases both...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013118506

Cooperation in Social Dilemmas Through Position Uncertainty

Gallice, Andrea - 2019

We present a natural environment that sustains full cooperation in one-shot social dilemmas among a finite number of self-interested agents. Players sequentially decide whether to contribute to a public good. They do not know their position in the sequence, but observe the actions of some...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012901935

A Group Public Goods Game with Position Uncertainty

Anwar, Sakib; Bruno, Jorge; SenGupta, Sonali - 2022

We model a dynamic public good contribution game, where players are (naturally) formed into groups. The groups are exogenously placed in a sequence, with limited information available to players about their groups’ position in the sequence. Contribution decisions are made by players...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014237520

Public-Good Provision with Macro Uncertainty about Preferences : Efficiency, Budget Balance, and Robustness

Hellwig, Martin - 2021

mechanism of d’Aspremont and Gérard-Varet is shown to implement an efficient provision rule with budget balance. However, first … mechanism is independent of the stochastic specification within the class of specifications defined by the structure of the …-Groves mechanism converges to zero in probability when the number of participants becomes large. In the limit, with a continuum of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013322513

The regulation of interdependent markets

Fiocco, Raffaele; Scarpa, Carlo - 2011

We examine the issue of whether two monopolists which produce substitutable goods should be regulated by one (centralization) or two (decentralization) regulatory authorities, when the regulator(s) can be partially captured by industry. Under full information, two decentralized agencies - each...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009267036

Regulatory risk under optimal incentive regulation

Strausz, Roland - 2009

The paper provides a tractable, analytical framework to study regulatory risk under optimal incentive regulation. Regulatory risk is captured by uncertainty about the policy variables in the regulator's objective function: weights attached to profits and costs of public funds. Results are as...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003796198

Regulatory risk under optimal incentive regulation

Strausz, Roland - 2009

The paper provides a tractable, analytical framework to study regulatory risk. Regulatory risk is captured by uncertainty about the policy variables in the regulator's objective function: weights attached to profits and costs of public funds. Results are as follows: 1) The regulator's reaction...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003850166

Optimal Risk Regulation of Monopolists with Subjective Risk Assessment

Kishishita, Daiki - 2020

This study aims at characterizing the optimal regulation of risky activities when risk assessment is subjective as a result of ambiguity on the probability of an accident. The attitudes toward ambiguity held by stakeholders form subjective risk perceptions, which substantially affect the optimal...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012837984