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Optimal Income Taxation and Public Goods Provision in a Large Economy with Aggregate Uncertainty
Bierbrauer, Felix J. - 2009
priori unknown. The analysis is based on a mechanism design approach that imposes a requirement of robustness with respect to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013158141
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Public-good provision with macro uncertainty about preferences : efficiency, budget balance, and robustness
Hellwig, Martin - 2021
mechanism of d'Aspremont and Gérard-Varet is shown to implement an effi cient provision rule with budget balance. However, first … mechanism is independent of the stochastic specification within the class of specifications defined by the structure of the …-Groves mechanism converges to zero in probability when the number of participants becomes large. In the limit, with a continuum of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012657865
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Public-Good Provision with Macro Uncertainty about Preferences : Efficiency, Budget Balance, and Robustness
Hellwig, Martin F. - 2021
mechanism of d’Aspremont and Gérard-Varet is shown to implement an efficient provision rule with budget balance. However, first … mechanism is independent of the stochastic specification within the class of specifications defined by the structure of the …-Groves mechanism converges to zero in probability when the number of participants becomes large. In the limit, with a continuum of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013322513
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Imperfect Public Monitoring with Costly Punishment - An Experimental Study
Ambrus, Attila - 2011
This paper experimentally investigates the effects of a costly punishment option on cooperation and social welfare in long finitely repeated public good contribution games. In a perfect monitoring environment increasing the severity of the potential punishment monotonically increases both...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013118506
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Regulatory risk under optimal incentive regulation
Strausz, Roland - 2009
The paper provides a tractable, analytical framework to study regulatory risk under optimal incentive regulation. Regulatory risk is captured by uncertainty about the policy variables in the regulator's objective function: weights attached to profits and costs of public funds. Results are as...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003796198
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Regulatory risk under optimal incentive regulation
Strausz, Roland - 2009
The paper provides a tractable, analytical framework to study regulatory risk. Regulatory risk is captured by uncertainty about the policy variables in the regulator's objective function: weights attached to profits and costs of public funds. Results are as follows: 1) The regulator's reaction...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003850166
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The regulation of interdependent markets
Fiocco, Raffaele; Scarpa, Carlo - 2011
We examine the issue of whether two monopolists which produce substitutable goods should be regulated by one (centralization) or two (decentralization) regulatory authorities, when the regulator(s) can be partially captured by industry. Under full information, two decentralized agencies - each...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009267036
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Optimal Risk Regulation of Monopolists with Subjective Risk Assessment
Kishishita, Daiki - 2020
This study aims at characterizing the optimal regulation of risky activities when risk assessment is subjective as a result of ambiguity on the probability of an accident. The attitudes toward ambiguity held by stakeholders form subjective risk perceptions, which substantially affect the optimal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012837984
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Regulatory Risk, Vertical Integration, and Upstream Investment
Fiocco, Raffaele - 2020
We investigate the impact of regulatory risk on vertical integration and upstream investment by a regulated firm that provides an essential input to downstream competitors. Regulatory risk reflects uncertainty about the regulator's commitment to a regulatory policy that promotes the regulated...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012844812
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Collusion Inducing Taxation of a Polluting Oligopoly
Benchekroun, Hassan - 2008
We show that an environmental regulation such as a tax on pollution can act as a collusive device and induce stable cartelization in an oligopolistic polluting industry. We consider a dynamic game where pollution is allowed to accumulate into a stock over time and a cartel that includes all the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012723065