We analyze institutional solutions to international cooperation when collective action creates negative externalities and splits the actors into supporters and opponents, all of whom can spend resources toward their preferred outcome. We study how actors can communicate their preferences through...

This paper analyses the role of ratification quotas in multilateral agreements over emission reduction. The higher is the quota, the lower is the level of emissions in case the agreement comes into force, but the higher is also the risk of failure. In a setting with incomplete information, two...

This paper extends the economic literature on the private provision of public goods by examining the relevance of perceptions of climate policy to voluntary contributions to the public good of climate protection. Based on an analytical model which allows for perceptions of climate policy such as...

We try to demonstrate how economists may engage in research on comparative politics, relating the size and composition of government spending to the political system. A Downsian model of electoral competition and forward-looking voting indicates that majoritarian -- as opposed to proportional --...

We try to demonstrate how economists may engage in research on comparative politics, relating the size and composition of government spending to the political system. A Downsian model of electoral competition and forward-looking voting indicates that majoritarian -- as opposed to proportional --...

We try to demonstrate how economists may engage in research on comparative politics, relating the size and composition of government spending to the political system. A Downsian model of electoral competition and forward-looking voting indicates that majoritarian--as opposed to...