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Informative Voting and the Samuelson Rule
Bierbrauer, Felix; Sahm, Marco - 2006
We study the classical free-rider problem in public goods provision in a large economy with uncertainty about the average valuation of the public good. Individual preferences over public goods are shaped by a skill and a taste parameter. We use a mechanism design approach to solve for the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010333766
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Informative voting and the Samuelson rule
Bierbrauer, Felix; Sahm, Marco - 2006
We study the classical free-rider problem in public goods provision in a large economy with uncertainty about the average valuation of the public good. Individual preferences over public goods are shaped by a skill and a taste parameter. We use a mechanism design approach to solve for the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010264796
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Optimal democratic mechanisms for taxation and public good provision
Bierbrauer, Felix; Sahm, Marco - 2008
We study the interdependence of optimal tax and expenditure policies. An optimal policy requires that information on preferences is made available. We first study this problem from a general mechanism design perspective and show that efficiency is possible only if the individuals who decide on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010264838
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Informative voting and the Samuelson rule
Bierbrauer, Felix; Sahm, Marco - 2006
We study the classical free-rider problem in public goods provision in a large economy with uncertainty about the average valuation of the public good. Individual preferences over public goods are shaped by a skill and a taste parameter. We use a mechanism design approach to solve for the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010374864
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Informative Voting and the Samuelson Rule
Bierbrauer, Felix; Sahm, Marco - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2006
We study the classical free-rider problem in public goods provision in a large economy with uncertainty about the average valuation of the public good. Individual preferences over public goods are shaped by a skill and a taste parameter. We use a mechanism design approach to solve for the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005785911
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Optimal Democratic Mechanisms for Taxation and Public Good Provision
Bierbrauer, Felix; Sahm, Marco - Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von … - 2008
We study the interdependence of optimal tax and expenditure policies. An optimal policy requires that information on preferences is made available. We first study this problem from a general mechanism design perspective and show that efficiency is possible only if the individuals who decide on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005772748
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Informative Voting and the Samuelson Rule
Bierbrauer, Felix; Sahm, Marco - Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von … - 2006
We study the classical free-rider problem in public goods provision in a large economy with uncertainty about the average valuation of the public good. Individual preferences over public goods are shaped by a skill and a taste parameter. We use a mechanism design approach to solve for the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005772800