We characterize the structure of Nash equilibria for a certain class of asset market games. In equilibrium, different assets have different returns, and (risk neutral) investors with different wealth hold portfolios with different structures. In equilibrium, an asset’s return is inversely...

We characterize the structure of Nash equilibria for a certain class of asset market games. In equilibrium, different assets have different returns, and (risk neutral) investors with different wealth hold portfolios with different structures. In equilibrium, an asset's return is inversely...

We observe that the imitation dynamics of Cubitt and Sugden (Review of Economic Studies, 1998, hereafter CS) is the same as the Replicator Dynamics for a certain class of games. Known results for such games then permit a more complete analysis of the CS imitation process, containing their...

We propose a model of price competition where consumers exogenously differ in the number of prices they compare. Our model can be interpreted either as a non–sequential search model or as a network model of price competition. We show that i) if consumers who previously just sampled one firm...

We observe that the imitation dynamics of Cubitt and Sugden (Review of Economic Studies, 1998, hereafter CS) is the same as the Replicator Dynamics for a certain class of games. Known results for such games then permit a more complete analysis of the CS imitation process, containing their...

We characterize the structure of Nash equilibria for a certain class of asset market games. In equilibrium, different assets have different returns, and (risk neutral) investors with different wealth hold portfolios with different structures. In equilibrium, an asset’s return is inversely...

We characterize the structure of Nash equilibria in asset market games with variable asset supply. In equilibrium, di®erent assets have dif- ferent returns, and (risk neutral) investors with di®erent wealth hold portfolios with di®erent structures. In equilibrium, an asset's return is...

We observe that the imitation dynamics of Cubitt and Sugden (CS) is the same as the Replicator Dynamics for a certain class of games. Known results for such games then permit a more complete analysis of the CS imitaion process, containing their results as special cases, and extending them...