messages, on their credibility and on actual play. We run an experiment in a three-player coordination game with Pareto ranked …The paper analyzes the role of the structure of communication - i.e. who is talking with whom - on the choice of … analysis of credibility, the subjects should communicate and play the Pareto optimal equilibrium only when communication is …

Costless and non-binding pre-play communication (cheap talk) has been found to often be effective in achieving … uncertainty in the framework of a 2x2 coordination game, in which one choice leads to the same payoff regardless of the action of … the other person's play. Cheap talk is found to be effective, as there is much more coordination in both Signal treatments …

We consider an experiment with a version of the Battle of the Sexes game with two-sided private information, allowing a … higher payoffs in the game when the talk is one-way as the truthful reports facilitate desired coordination …

type-coordination property: it fully coordinates on the ex-post efficient pure Nash equilibrium when the players' types are … different. Type-coordination is also obtained in a partially revealing equilibrium in which only the High-type is not truthful …

We consider an experiment with a version of the Battle of the Sexes game with two-sided private information, preceded … talk is one-way as the truthful reports facilitate desired coordination. …

This paper reports on an experiment testing Credible Message Rationalizability (CMR) in one-shot and repeated signaling … games with costless communication. CMR is a non-equilibrium theory combining rationalizability with the idea that players …