Based on empirical evidence, a simple model of oil exploration and discovery is deyeloped, which emphasizes the stochastics of the discovery process and its informational aspects. Open-loop-feedback, m-measurement-feedback and closed-loop optimal exploratory strategies are derived. In...

We propose a new Bayesian synthetic control framework to overcome limitations of extant synthetic control methods (SCMs). The proposed Bayesian synthetic control methods (BSCMs) do not impose any restrictive constraints on the parameter space a priori. Moreover, they provide statistical...

We study optimal experimentation by a monopolistic platform in a two-sided market framework. The platform provider faces uncertainty about the strength of the externality each side is exerting on the other. It maximizes the expected present value of its profit stream in a continuous-time...

We study optimal experimentation by a monopolistic platform in a two-sided market. The platform provider is uncertain about the strength of the externality each side is exerting on the other. Setting participation fees on both sides, it gradually learns about these externalities by observing...

We study optimal experimentation by a monopolistic platform in a two-sided mar- ket. The platform provider faces uncertainty about the strength of the externality each side is exerting on the other. It maximizes the expected present value of its profit stream in a continuous-time...

This paper considers the optimal control problem of a small nonlinear econometric model under parameter uncertainty and passive learning (open-loop feedback). Traditionally, this type of problems has been approached by applying linear-quadratic optimization algorithms. However, the literature...

We study optimal experimentation by a monopolistic platform in a two-sided market. The platform provider is uncertain about the strength of the externality each side is exerting on the other. Setting participation fees on both sides, it gradually learns about these externalities by observing...

We study optimal experimentation by a monopolistic platform in a two-sided market. The platform provider is uncertain about the strength of the externality each side is exerting on the other. Setting participation fees on both sides, it gradually learns about these externalities by observing...