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Fair reallocation in economies with single-peaked preferences
Hashimoto, Kazuhiko; Wakayama, Takuma - 2015
We consider the problem of fairly reallocating the individual endowments of a perfectly divisible good among agents with single-peaked preferences. We provide a new concept of fairness, called position-wise envy-freeness, that is compatible with individual rationality. This new concept requires...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011317289
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Strategy-proofness on bankruptcy problems with an indivisible object
Hashimoto, Kazuhiko; Nakayama, Yu - 2016
We analyze bankruptcy problems with an indivisible object, where real owners and outside traders want to allocate an indivisible object among them with monetary compensation. The object might be a company that has gone bankrupt or a house left by a parent who has died, and so on. We show that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011434024
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Non-bossiness
Thomson, William - 2014
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010487237
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A Maximal Domain for Strategy-Proof and No-Vetoer Rules in the Multi-Object Choice Model
Hatsumi, Kentaro - 2013
Following Barbera, Sonnenschein, and Zhou (1991, Econometrica 59, 595-609), we study rules (or social choice functions) through which agents select a subset from a set of objects. We investigate domains on which there exist nontrivial strategy-proof rules. We establish that the set of separable...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013093515
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Arrovian efficiency and auditability in discrete mechanism design
Pycia, Marek; Ünver, M. Utku - 2021 - This draft: November 2021
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012805188
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Maximal Domains for Strategy-Proof or Maskin Monotonic Choice Rules
Bochet, Olivier - 2009
Domains of individual preferences for which the well-known impossibility theorems of Gibbard-Satterthwaite and Muller-Satterthwaite do not hold are studied. To comprehend the limitations these results imply for social choice rules, we search for the largest domains that are possible. Here, we...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012720425
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Strategy-proof mechanism design with non-quasilinear preferences : ex-post revenue maximization for an arbitrary number of objects
Sakai, Ryosuke; Serizawa, Shigehiro - 2020
We consider the multi-object allocation problem with monetary transfers where each agent obtains at most one object … (unit-demand). We focus on allocation rules satisfying individual rationality, non-waste fulness, equal treatment of equals …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012303350
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Mechanism design without quasilinearity
Kazumura, Tomoya; Mishra, Debasis; Serizawa, Shigehiro - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 15 (2020) 2, pp. 511-544
establish a revenue uniqueness result: for every dominant strategy implementable allocation rule, there is a unique payment rule …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012308444
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Asymptotic ordinal inefficiency of random serial dictatorship
Manea, Mihai - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 4 (2009) 2, pp. 165-197
We establish that the fraction of preference profiles for which the random serial dictatorship allocation is ordinally … efficient vanishes for allocation problems with many object types. We consider also a probabilistic setting where in expectation … becomes large. We provide results with similarly negative content for allocation problems with many objects of each type. One …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011699119
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Arrovian efficiency in allocation of discrete resources
Pycia, Marek; Ünver, M. Utku - 2016
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011590745