International joint ventures (JV) are popular institutional forms chosen by the less developed countries (LDCs) to attract foreign Investments. In this paper we describe a set up where a multinational firm (MNF) decides on the volume of investment and the LDC gov-ernment offers a package...

The competitive allocation of labor across different sectors of an economy may not be socially optimal when one sector uses foreign capital. We argue that a suitably designed government intervention is required to restrict the sectors to their optimal size and maximize national welfare. Such a...

In the presence of inequality a status-driven utility function reconciles the conflict between income-based and nutrition-based measures of poverty. Moreover, it can explain why the poor tend to save less, an established empirical fact in the developing countries. The result is independent of...

We study the possibility of cartel formation among primary exporters who face an inelastic world demand for their exports. By constructing an appropriate infinitely repeated export game, we show that varying country sizes will pose difficulties in sustaining the collusive behaviour.

This paper builds up a two country model of trade and unemployment allowing for perfect mobility of capital across the borders. Capital moves from the north to the south, which suffers from unemployment. A few basic policies related to lowering of unemployment are discussed. In particular it is...

The classical Wage Fund (Capital or Credit) framework is integrated with the simplest text-book version of the Ricardian model of comparative advantage, generating a model that replicates important features of the neo-classical production theory involving capital and labour without neo-classical...