Narrow search
Showing 1 - 10 of 186,376
Cover Image
The Marketability of Bank Assets and Managerial Rents : Implications for Financial Stability
Fecht, Falko - 2016
Ongoing financial innovation and greater information availability increase the tradability of bank assets and reduce banks' dependence on individual bank managers as private information in the lending process declines. In this paper we argue that this has two effects on banks, with opposing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012989289
Cover Image
Financial debt contracting and managerial agency problems
Imbierowicz, Björn; Streitz, Daniel - In: Financial management : FM 53 (2024) 1, pp. 99-118
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014543536
Cover Image
Credit frictions, selection into external finance, and gains from trade
Unger, Florian - 2019
This paper analyzes the effects of credit frictions in a trade model where heterogeneous firms select both into exporting and into two types of external finance. In our framework, small producers face stronger credit frictions, pay a higher borrowing rate and rely on bank finance, whereas large...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012016063
Cover Image
The efficiency of central clearing : a segmented markets approach
Hansen, James; Moore, Angus - 2016
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013259667
Cover Image
Hedge Commitments and Agency Costs of Debt : Evidence from Interest Rate Protection Covenants and Accounting Conservatism
Beatty, Anne - 2011
conservatism enhances hedge commitments. We examine 2,338 bank loans entered into by 263 mandatory derivative users that are … contractually obligated by interest rate protection covenants, 709 voluntary derivative users, and 1,366 non-users. We show that … significantly reduce their interest rates. While we do not find an average interest savings for voluntary derivative users, we do …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013134406
Cover Image
You don't always get what you pay for
Schnedler, Wendelin - 2007
Consider a principal-agent relationship in which more effort by the agent raises the likelihood of success. Does rewarding success, i.e., paying a bonus, increase effort in this case? I find that bonuses have not only an incentive but also an income effect. Overall, bonuses paid for success may...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003592884
Cover Image
The overpricing problem : moral hazard and franchieses
Eckert, Heather; Hannweber, Troy; VanEgteren, Henry - 2012
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009501120
Cover Image
Standards and incentives under moral hazard with limited liability
Reinshagen, Felix - 2012
We consider a model of moral hazard with limited liability of the agent and effort that is two-dimensional. One dimension of the agent's effort is observable and the other is not. The principal can thusmake the contract conditional not only on outcome but also on observable effort. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009490184
Cover Image
Merger performance and managerial incentives
Kräkel, Matthias; Müller, Daniel - 2014
We consider a two-stage principal-agent model with limited liability in which a CEO is employed as agent to gather information about suitable merger targets and to manage the merged corporation in case of an acquisition. Our results show that the CEO systematically recommends targets with low...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011430291
Cover Image
Optimal deterrence of illegal behavior under imperfect corporate governance
Argenton, Cédric; Damme, Eric E. C. van - 2014
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011285513