Showing 1 - 10 of 17
Suppose the value of a firm is endogenously determined by a manager's costly effort. We call this manager a distinguished player if he also can trade shares of the firm on a market. Arbitrage-free asset pricing theory suggests that the equilibrium market price reflects the value increasing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010300193
We find that contrary to common perception, cooperation as equilibrium of the infinitely repeated discounted prisoner's dilemma is in many relevant cases not very plausible, or at least questionable: for a significant subset of the payoff-discount factor parameter space cooperation equilibria...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281240
Suppose the value of a firm is endogenously determined by a manager's costly effort. We call this manager a distinguished player if he also can trade shares of the firm on a market. Arbitrage-free asset pricing theory suggests that the equilibrium market price reflects the value increasing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003776197
We find that contrary to common perception, cooperation as equilibrium of the infinitely repeated discounted prisoner's dilemma is in many relevant cases not very plausible, or at least questionable: for a significant subset of the payoff-discount factor parameter space cooperation equilibria...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001600066
Arbitrage-free asset pricing theory suggests that equilibrium price and equilibrium value of a firm coincide and correctly anticipate the equilibrium effort of a value-enhancing manager, called the distinguished player. This article shows that in equilibrium investors trade shares of such a firm...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012720349
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014545385
We consider a public firm characterized by a moral hazard problem. A distinguished player is a CEO or activist shareholder who (i) is unrestricted to trade shares and (ii) has discretion to increase the value of this firm by exerting costly effort. Von Lilienfeld-Toal and Ru ̈nzi (2014)...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012845868
We test infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma games with random continuation in the laboratory to capture the effect of strategic risk on co-operation. We propose a criterion building on Harsanyi and Selten's (1988) risk dominance concept and motivate it by three heuristic principles. Our...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014213776
We propose a general framework for analyzing and comparing ownership structures with respect to creating incentives for co-operative behavior (e.g. efficient investment) in long-run relationships. We generalize models by Garvey (1995), Halonen (2002), and Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (2002) and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014105738
Islamic fundamentalists and their secular opponents recognize that the decision of women to cover their head in public generates social pressures to conform on those wishing to remain unveiled. This article identifies the essence of social coordination problems generated by this type of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014121607