This paper shows that a multiproduct firm may find it optimal not to delegate the sales of all products and therefore to employ different distribution channels for different products. It faces the following trade-off: There is a strategic effect associated with delegation, but if both products'...

The design of equilibrium protocols in sender-receiver games where communication is noisy occupies an important place in the Economic literature. This paper shows that the common way of constructing a noisy channel communication protocol in Information Theory does not necessarily lead to a Nash...

Strategic interaction in oligopolistic markets has been extensively studied in the literature. This literature deals mostly with the case of multiple firms which produce a homogeneous good or goods that are perfect substitutes. In this paper we provide a simple model of price competition in a...

This paper shows the existence of an equilibrium pragmatic Language with a universal grammar as a coordination device under communication misunderstandings. Such a language plays a key role in achieving efficient outcomes in those Sender-Receiver games where there may exist noisy information...

This paper analyzes how learning considerations may influence the pricing behavior of a duopoly facing demand uncertainty. We consider a symmetric duopoly game with product differentiation where firms have imperfect information about some parameters of the market demands. Firm learn about these...