Showing 1 - 10 of 196,001
The authors show how the influence of extrinsic random signals depends on the noise structure of these signals. They present an experiment on a coordination game in which extrinsic random signals may generate sunspot equilibria. They measure how these signals affect behavior. Sunspot equilibria...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009723757
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003766080
In his work on market signaling, Spence proposed a dynamic model of a signaling market in which a buyer revises prices in light of experience and sellers choose utility-maximizing signals given these prices. Spence also suggested that subjecting the dynamic process to rare perturbations might...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009697462
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011285514
The paper aims to present an exchange ratio for merging companies that incorporates the change in the level of riskiness. Its main objective has been achieved exploiting CAPM offers a formula that determines a risk-adjusted exchange ratio that takes into account both risk and synergy
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013083064
We consider a model of bottleneck congestion in discrete time with a penalty cost for being late. This model can be applied to several situations where agents need to use a capacitated facility in order to complete a task before a hard deadline. A possible example is a situation where commuters...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012120099
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011639326
I introduce a new framework to study environments with both structural and strategic uncertainty, different from Harsanyi's (1967-8) `Bayesian games', that allows a researcher to test the robustness of Nash predictions while maintaining certain desirable restrictions on players' beliefs. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011686678
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011882138
We consider non-zero sum bi-matrix games where one player presumes the role of a leader in the Stackelberg model, while the other player is her follower. We show that the leader can improve her reward if she can incentivise her follower by paying some of her own utility to the follower for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011891212