The usual negative effect of queue size on arrival to an M/M/c service facility is augmented, in this paper, by the negative network effect due to waiting with others, which increases as the exposure to others increases. The reward and cost structure acquires a new meaning, as the cost of...

Naor's (1969) celebrated paper studies customer decisions in an observable M/M/1 queue where joining-customers utility is linearly decreasing with the joining position. Naor derives the optimal threshold strategies for the individuals, social planner and monopolist, and proves the monopoly...

We consider an individual's choice whether to be evaluated. Separating signaling equilibria can arise when individuals are risk averse, even if the cost of evaluation is zero for all.

Consider a government that adopts a program, sees a noisy signal about its success, and decides whether to continue the program. Suppose further that the success of a program is greater if people think it will be continued. This paper considers the optimal decision rule for continuing the...

We consider a leader and a subordinate he appoints who engage in team production. The public observes the organization's performance, but is unable to determine the separate contributions of the leader and of the subordinate. The leader may therefore claim credit for the good work of his...

We consider taxation by a Leviathan government and by a utilitarian government in the presence of heterogenous locations within a country, when migration from one country to another is and is not possible. In a closed economy, a utilitarian government may transfer income from the poor to the...