We investigate regulation as the outcome of a bargaining process between a regulator and a regulated firm. The regulator is required to monitor the firm's costs and reveal its information to a political principal (Congress). In this setting, we explore the scope for collusion between the...

This paper characterizes equilibrium outcomes of extensive form games with incomplete information in which players can sign renegotiable contracts with third-parties. Our aim is to understand the extent to which third-party contracts can be used as commitment devices when it is impossible to...

This Article studies the growing use of contract in bankruptcy. Sophisticated “distress” investors (for example, hedge funds and private equity funds) increasingly enter into contracts amongst themselves and corporate debtors during bankruptcy in order to evade “mandatory” rules on the...

I study a repeated principal-agent game with long‐term output contracts that can be renegotiated at will. Actions are observable but not contractible, so they can only be incentivized through implicit agreements formed in equilibrium. I show that contract renegotiation is a powerful tool for...

This paper studies a continuous-time, nite-horizon contracting problem with renegotiationand dynamic inconsistency arising from non-exponential discounting. Theproblem is formulated as a dynamic game played among the agent, the principal andtheir respective future "selves", each with their own...