"Organizational law empowers firms to hold assets and enter contracts as entities that are legally distinct from their owners and managers. Legal scholars and economists have commented extensively on one form of this partitioning between firms and owners: namely, the rule of limited liability...

This paper is the first chapter of the third edition of The Anatomy of Corporate Law: A Comparative and Functional Approach, by Reinier Kraakman, John Armour, Paul Davies, Luca Enriques, Henry Hansmann, Gerard Hertig, Klaus Hopt, Hideki Kanda Mariana Pargendler, Georg Ringe, and Edward Rock...

This paper is the third chapter of the third edition of The Anatomy of Corporate Law: A Comparative and Functional Approach, by Reinier Kraakman, John Armour, Paul Davies, Luca Enriques, Henry Hansmann, Gerard Hertig, Klaus Hopt, Hideki Kanda Mariana Pargendler, Georg Ringe, and Edward Rock...

This Article analyzes the functions served by the law of trusts and asks, first, whether the basic tools of contract and agency law could fulfill the same functions and, second, whether trust law provides benefits that are not provided by the law of corporations. The analysis is motivated in...

Once widely considered just a theoretical curiosity or an ideological aspiration, employee ownership of enterprise has attracted considerable interest in recent years as a practical matter of organization. In the West, this interest derives in considerable part from the decline of unionism and...

In modern economies, large-scale enterprise exhibits a variety of ownership forms. Most common and familiar is ownership by those persons -- individuals or organizations -- that supply the firm with financial capital. Other forms of ownership are important as well, however, including employee...