The so-called excess-entry theorem (Mankiw and Whinston 1986, Suzumura and Kiyono, 1987) establishes conditions guaranteeing that more firms enter a homogeneous Cournotoligopoly in equilibrium than a benevolent government prefers. We generalise the approach and analyse the behaviour of a...

The relevant competitors in regard to innovation might, but not necessarily do, correspond to the identified competitors on actual product markets. Hence, the conventional analysis of product markets, in order to assess the potential anticompetitive effects of mergers, is insufficient to capture...

In several European merger cases competition authorities have demanded that the merging firm auctions off virtual capacity. The buyer of virtual capacity receives an option on an amount of output at a pre-specified price, typically equal to marginal cost. This output is sold in the market in...

Some path-breaking work on mergers takes efficiency gains for granted, or assumes that firms have perfect knowledge when taking merger decisions. In practice, firms and competition authorities cannot know exact future efficiency gains, prior to merger consummation. This paper analyzes horizontal...

Despite the successes of cartel detection over the last twenty years, there are many who believe that competition authorities have just started to scratch the surface. The focus of this note is to make the case that proactive detection and deterrence policies need to be established, and that...