This paper compares efficiencies of double auction and bilateral trading in GHG emission trading experiments with the addition of two rules, abatement irreversibility of GHG emissions and non-compliance penalty, to Hizen and Saijo (1998). Using a new concept of equilibrium, we found that (i)...

Despite the objection of the Bush administration to the U.S.’s ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, its entry into force has come to be realistic due to the Bonn Agreement in July. The purpose of this paper is first to survey the framework of the Protocol, and then to analyze the strategic...

This paper reports the theoretical and experimental results of auctions for public construction in which firms cut corners. We show that winning bids and qualities of the constructed buildings are both zero in equilibria if there are at least two firms whose initial cash balances are zero. The...

Several Japanese local governments started to add endogenous minimum prices to firstprice auctions in their public procurements. Any bid less than the endogenous minimum price is referred to as abnormally low and is excluded from the procurement procedure. The endogenous minimum price is...

This paper analyzes an auction mechanism that excludes overoptimistic bidders inspired by the rules of the procurement auctions adopted by several Japanese local governments. Our theoretical and experimental results suggest that the endogenous exclusion rule reduces the probability of suffering...

This paper studies behavior in experiments with a linear voluntary contributions mechanism for public goods conducted in Japan, the Netherlands, Spain and the USA. The same experimental design was used in the four countries. Our 'contribution function' design allows us to obtain a view of...