This paper investigates the strategic value of the managerial incentive scheme in affecting firms' incentive in R&D investment and their product market activities. Firstly, we find that in Cournot-quantity competition, owners strategically assign a non-profit-maximization objective to their...

This paper investigates the strategic value of the managerial incentive scheme in affecting firms' incentive in R&D investment and their product market activities. Firstly, we find that in Cournot-quantity competition, owners strategically assign a non-profit-maximization objective to their...

This paper examines empirically the role of market structure for the influence of spill-over effects on R&D-cooperations. The results of a microeconometric analysis, based on firm data on innovation, let in general presume that with intensified competition also the influence of spillovers on...

In this paper, we analyze the impact of cooperation on R&D investments in a two-sided market, where platforms compete in quantities. We show that if indirect externalities are of a moderate magnitude, the threshold degree of spillovers above which cooperation spurs R&D investments and enhances...

We develop a model of R&D collaboration in which individual firms carry out in-house research on core activities and undertake bilateral joint projects on non-core activities with other firms. We develop conditions on the profit functions of the firm under which R&D investments in different...

This paper describes a classroom experiment that illustrates the research and development investment incentives facing firms when technological spillovers are present. The game involves two stages in which student sellers first make investment decisions then production decisions. The classroom...

This paper derives a three stage Cournot duopoly game for research collaboration, research expenditures and product market competition. The amount of knowledge firms can absorb is made dependent on their own research efforts, e.g. firms' absorptive capacity is treated as an endogenous variable....