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Saez-Marti and Weibull [4] investigate the consequences of letting some agents play a myopic best reply to the myopic best reply in Young's [8] bargaining model. This is how they introduce "cleverness" of players. We analyze such clever agents in general finite two-player games. We show that...
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In the text-book model of dynamic Bertrand competition, competing firms meet the same demand function every period. This is not a satisfactory model of the demand side if consumers can make intertemporal substitution between periods. Each period then leaves some residual demand to future...
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We develop a model of contests on networks. Each player is “connected” to a set of contests and exerts a single effort to increase the probability of winning each contest to which she is connected. We characterize equilibria under the Tullock contest success function and explore how behavior...
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We consider mechanisms for allocating a common-value prize between two players in an incomplete information setting. In this setting, each player receives an independent private signal about the prize value. The signals are from a discrete distribution and the value is increasing in both...
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