We study the optimal quota sequence, in a stationary environment, where a regulator and a non-strategic firm have asymmetric information. The regulator is able to learn about the unknown cost parameter by using a quota that is slack with positive probability. It is never optimal for the...

New York is considering additional emission regulation on top of its obligations under the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) to achieve its State Energy Plan targets. The proposed measure is a so-called "carbon adder" on CO2 emissions from the power sector which is set as the difference...

This paper reviews lessons that can be learned from U.S. experiences with market-based environmental policies and from related research. Highlights of U.S. experience are summarized with four categories of policy instruments: pollution charges; tradable permits; market friction reductions; and...

There is extreme heterogeneity of firms regulated under the European Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) in terms of emissions evels and employed technology. We present a model that shows that behavior of firms under quantity regulation can differ strongly, dependent on the characteristics of the...

Project-based emissions trading schemes, like the Clean Development Mechanism, are particularly prone to problems of asymmetric information between project parties and the regulator. In this paper, we extend the general framework on incomplete enforcement of policy instruments to reflect the...

Policy makers and analysts are often faced with situations where it is unclear whether market-based instruments hold real promise of reducing costs, relative to conventional uniform standards. We develop analytic expressions that can be employed with modest amounts of information to estimate the...