SUMMARY We provide the first empirical application of a new approach proposed by Lee (Journal of Econometrics 2007; <b>140</b>(2), 333–374) to estimate peer effects in a linear‐in‐means model when individuals interact in groups. Assumingsufficient group size variation, this approach allows to control...

We provide the first empirical application of a new approach proposed by Lee (2007) to estimate peer effects in a linear-in-means model. This approach allows to control for group-level unobservable and to solve the reflection problem. We investigate peer effects in student achievement in...

In a social network, agents have their own reference group which may influence their behaviour. In turn, the agents' attributes and their behaviour affect the formation and the structure of the social network. This paper surveys the econometric literature on both aspects of social networks, and...

We provide the first empirical application of a new approach proposed by Lee (2007) to estimate peer effects in a linear-in-means model when individuals interact in groups. Assuming sufficient group size variation, this approach allows to control for correlated effects at the group level and to...

We provide the first theoretical analysis of altruism in networks. Agents are embedded in a fixed, weighted network and care about their direct friends. Given some initial distribution of incomes, they may decide to support their poorer friends. We study the resulting non-cooperative transfer...

We study network games with linear best-replies and strategic complementarities. We assume that actions are continuous but bounded from above. We show that there is always a unique equilibrium. We find that two key features of these games under small network effects may not hold when network...

We study network games with linear best-replies and strategic complementarities. We assume that actions are continuous but bounded from above. We show that there is always a unique equilibrium. We find that two key features of these games under small network effects may not hold when network...

We provide the first theoretical analysis of altruism in networks. Agents are embedded in a fixed, weighted network and care about their direct friends. Given some initial distribution of incomes, they may decide to support their poorer friends. We study the resulting non-cooperative transfer...

This paper brings a general network analysis to a wide class of economic games. A network, or interaction matrix, tells who directly interacts with whom. A major challenge is determining how network structure shapes overall outcomes. We have a striking result. Equilibrium conditions depend on a...

We study the influence of social networks on labor market transitions. We develop the first model where social ties and job status coevolve through time. Our key assumption is that the probability of formation of a new tie is greater between two employed individuals than between an employed and...