This paper investigates, both theoretically and empirically, the implications that complementary assets needed for the formation of start-ups - proxied by the ease of access to financial resources - have on the innovative efforts of incumbent firms. In particular, we develop a theoretical model,...

This paper investigates, both theoretically and empirically, the implications that complementary assets needed for the formation of start-ups - proxied by the ease of access to financial resources - have on the innovative efforts of incumbent firms. In particular, we develop a theoretical model,...

We study lobbying behavior by firms in a two-region economy, with either centralized or decentralized provision of profit-enhancing local public goods. Firms compete either in the market, lobbying for public good provision once entered in a market, or for the market, lobbying to gain ccess to...

We study a competitive insurance market in which insurers have an imperfect informative advantage over policyholders. We show that the presence of insurers privately and heterogeneously informed about risk can explain the concentration levels, the persistent profitability and the pooling of risk...

When the debt of firms in distress is dispersed, a restructuring agreement is difficult to reach because of free riding. We develop a repeated game in which banks come across each other frequently, allowing them to threaten a punishment in case of free riding. As the number of lending banks...