Showing 1 - 10 of 10
We consider merger remedies of the U.S. Department of Justice's Antitrust Division and the U.S. Federal Trade Commission between 2008 and 2017. Traditionally one distinguishes between structural and behavioral remedies' and structural remedies are generally considered to be more effective and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011731113
We consider merger remedies of the U.S. Department of Justice's Antitrust Division and the U.S. Federal Trade Commission between 2008 and 2017. Traditionally one distinguishes between structural and behavioral remedies' and structural remedies are generally considered to be more effective and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011731182
We consider merger remedies of the U.S. Department of Justice's Antitrust Division and the U.S. Federal Trade Commission between 2008 and 2017. Traditionally one distinguishes between structural and behavioral remedies—and structural remedies are generally considered to be more effective and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012944690
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010843392
Several recent papers argue that price-matching policies raise equilibrium prices. We add to this literature by considering potential welfare losses, which have two sources: Harberger triangles from high prices and Posner rectangles from over-entry. We compare price-matching markets with entry...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010536618
This paper covers the activities of the Economic Analysis Group (EAG) of the Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice, during 2005-2006. It describes the economic analysis undertaken by EAG in several important investigations, appellate matters, and other activities as an advocate for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014053218
This paper covers the activities of the Economic Analysis Group (EAG), during 2004-2005. It describes the economic analysis undertaken by EAG in several important investigations, appellate matters, and other activities as an advocate for competition
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014053219
Markups are often much higher on aftermarket products than on corresponding durable goods. Many theoretical explanations of this phenomenon have been advanced, but little empirical work has tested them. Using data on laser printer toner and memory pricing, this paper sheds some empirical light...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014116590
Price markups over marginal cost are often higher on "aftermarket" parts and services for durable goods than they are on the goods themselves. A popular explanation is that the aftermarket good is used as a "metering" device. This paper explores what happens in the metering model as foremarket...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014035990
The European Commission blocked the proposed 2001 merger of General Electric and Honeywell in part because of fears about the past and future effect on competition of GE's aircraft leasing arm, GECAS. It argued that in the past GECAS had skewed aircraft engine sales toward GE in a way that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014075192