In this paper we introduce bounded rationality into the standard Mussa and Rosen (1978) model. We obtain the necessary conditions for the monopolist to benefit from the boundedly rational behavior of the consumers and discuss the incidence of costs of boundedly rational behavior. We also obtain...

We reexamine the classical principal-agent problems and place them in a new perspective. Our motivation comes from two observations in the real world that fail to be captured by the classical principal-agent models: the agent's action space is rich and optimal incentive contracts tend to be...

In this paper we use the approach developed by Mirrlees-Zhou (2006) to analyze repeated principal-agent models. It is shown that the major results of the static models can be generalized to the dynamic settings. In addition, we address and reexamine new issues arising from the dynamic dimension....

In this paper, I shall discuss how national income should be measured in an 'imperfect' economy, where feasible policy instruments such as taxes, tariffs, quotas, and quantitative controls do not operate in a lumpsum manner, and may be far from their optimum level. In particular, I want to...

This presentation is about poverty and redistribution in emerging economics. It was prepared for the Asian Development Bank’s Distinguished Speakers Program held on 25 October 2011 at the ADB Headquarters. Various types of poverty alleviation programs are discussed, and the central role of...

It is a natural presumption that there should be less distorting taxation when there are more decisions based on the prices distorted by taxation. This note shows the need for an additional assumption in order to reach the conclusion. We consider a competitive model with one consumption good,...

Prize Lecture to the memory of Alfred Nobel, December 9, 1996.

Interview with Professor James A. Mirrlees at the 1st Meeting of Laureates in Economic Sciences in Lindau, Germany, September 1-4, 2004. Interviewer is freelance journalist Marika Griehsel.