We consider a cooperative model of bargaining where the location of thedisagreement point may be uncertain. Based on the maximin criterion, we formulate anex ante effciency condition and characterize the class of bargaining solutions satisfyingthis axiom...

[...]In this paper, I examine two methods of measuringthe value of better schools. One involves following individualsover time to determine how the quality of theirschooling affects outcomes later in their lives; the otherinvolves calculating parental valuation of better schoolstoday. I review...

[...]In this article, we explore the relationship betweenfranchise value and risk taking over the 1986-94 period.We extend Keeley’s empirical analysis by estimating theeffect of franchise value on a variety of measures of bankrisk. We find an inverse relationship between franchisevalue and an...

[...]The analysis of competitive markets culminated in the fundamental theorems of welfare economics which elucidated the (restrictive) conditions under which resource allocation by markets would achieve Pareto efficiency. The first fundamental theorem says that all perfectly competitive...

Two rationality arguments are used to justify the link between condi-tional and unconditional preferences in decision theory: dynamic consistencyand consequentialism. Dynamic consistency requires that ex ante contingentchoices are respected by updated preferences. Consequentialism states...

This paper studies the problem of optimal investment with CRRA (constant, relative risk aversion) preferences, subject to dynamic risk constraints on trading strategies. The market model considered is continuous in time and incomplete; furthermore, financial assets are modeled by Itô processes....

When person A makes an offer to person B and B rejects it, then A may lose face. This loss of face is assumed to occur only if B knows for sure of A's offer. While under some circumstances loss of face can be rationalized by the consequences for future reputation, it may also enter directly into...