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The information created and disseminated through the litigation process can have social value. Suppose a long-lived plaintiff is suing a defendant for damages sustained in an accident. The plaintiff may suffer similar damages in future accidents involving different defendants. Potential injurers...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013226203
The information created and disseminated through the litigation process can have social value. Suppose a long-lived plaintiff is suing a defendant for damages sustained in an accident. The plaintiff may suffer similar damages in future accidents involving different defendants. Potential injurers...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012467744
The information that is created and disseminated through the litigation process can have social value. When economic agents learn about risks, they can fine-tune their future behaviors to mitigate these risks. Specifically, suppose that an injured plaintiff sues a defendant for damages sustained...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014071267
The information that is created and disseminated through the litigation process can have social value. When economic agents learn about risks, they can fine-tune their future behaviors to mitigate these risks. Specifically, suppose that an injured plaintiff sues a defendant for damages sustained...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002256672
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002496222
pursuit producing positive externalities. The Article enumerates these collateral social benefits, grouping them as: 1) decree … the concept of deterrence does not capture these non-compensatory benefits as well as the concept of externalities does …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012780538
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003866659
We consider antitrust enforcement within the adversarial model used by the United States. We show that, under the adversarial system, the Antitrust Authority may try to prohibit mergers also in those cases in which litigation is ineØ cient. Even if market concentration and technological...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003421145
Litigation seems to be a Pareto-ineffcient outcome of pretrial bargaining; however, this paper shows that litigation can be the outcome of rational behavior by a litigant and her attorney. If the attorney has more information than his client concerning the characteristics of the lawsuit, the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008823162
We model the settlement of a legal dispute where the trial outcome depends on the behavior of a strategically motivated judge. We consider a standard asymmetric information model where the uninformed defendant makes a take it or leave it offer. If the case goes to trial, the judge decides how...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009302054