This paper introduces harassment in a model of bribery and corruption. We characterize the harassment equilibrium and show that taxpayers with all possible levels of income participate in such an equilibrium. Harassment has a regressive bias. Harassment cost as such may not affect tax revenue....

We study the implications of credit constraints for the sustainability of product market collusion in a bank-financed oligopoly in which firms face an imperfect credit market. We consider two situations, without and with credit rationing, i.e., with a binding credit limit. When there is credit...

In the presence of inequality a status-driven utility function reconciles the conflict between income-based and nutrition-based measures of poverty. Moreover, it can explain why the poor tend to save less, an established empirical fact in the developing countries. The result is independent of...

We study the possibility of cartel formation among primary exporters who face an inelastic world demand for their exports. By constructing an appropriate infinitely repeated export game, we show that varying country sizes will pose difficulties in sustaining the collusive behaviour.

This paper builds up a two country model of trade and unemployment allowing for perfect mobility of capital across the borders. Capital moves from the north to the south, which suffers from unemployment. A few basic policies related to lowering of unemployment are discussed. In particular it is...