Using the SEC’s 2004 decision to begin publicly disclosing its comment letters, we study the consequences of increased regulatory transparency on the banking industry. Because the SEC only issues comment letters to public banks, we exploit a difference-in-differences design to examine the...

This paper explores the feasibility to extend the Standard Cost Model (SCM) for calculating the costs of government regulation by taking all transaction costs into account which stem from the principal/agent relationship between regulatory authorities and economic entities. From that perspective...

We show that distortion in the size distribution of banks around regulatory thresholds can be used to identify costs of bank regulation. We build a structural model in which banks can strategically bunch their assets below regulatory thresholds to avoid regulations. The resulting distortion in...

Die EU-Institutionen legen seit einiger Zeit komplexe Konzepte und Regelwerke mit Produktbezug wie etwa die Integrierte Produktpolitik (IPP) oder die Rahmenrichtlinie zur umweltgerechten Gestaltung energiebetriebener Produkte (EUP) vor. Diese neuen, politisch gesetzten Umfeldbedingungen werden...

Legal academics, journalists, and senior executive branch officials alike have assumed that the economic costs of regulatory requirements go up in severe recessions that drive interest rates to zero. But this is not correct; the aggregate costs of regulatory requirements decrease, not increase,...

We exploit the establishment of a supranational supervisor in Europe (the Single Supervisory Mechanism) to learn how the organizational design of supervisory institutions impacts the enforcement of financial regulation. Banks under supranational supervision are required to increase regulatory...