This paper establishes existence of a stationary Markov perfect equilibrium in general stochastic games with noise — a component of the state that is nonatomically distributed and not directly affected by the previous period’s state and actions. Noise may be simply a payoff irrelevant public...

This paper disentangles the topological assumptions of classical results (e.g., Walker (1977)) on existence of maximal elements from rationality conditions. It is known from the social choice literature that under the standard topological conditions—with no other restrictions on...

This paper studies stationary Markov perfect equilibria in multidimensional models of dynamic bargaining, in which the alternative chosen in one period determines the status quo for the next. We generalize a sufficient condition for existence of equilibrium due to Anesi and Seidmann, 2015. We...

This note examines the structure of stationary bargaining equilibria in the nite framework of Anesi (2010). The main result establishes a tight connection between the set of equilibrium absorbing points and the von Neumann-Morgestern solutions: assuming that players are patient, that the voting...

We show that dynamic bargaining games are characterized by a continuum of stationary Markov perfect equilibria, when the set of alternatives is multidimensional and players are patient. In fact, we show that there is a continuum of equilibria close to any alternative satisfying a simple linear...

Harris, Reny, and Robson (1995) added a public randomization device to dynamic games with almost perfect information to ensure existence of subgame perfect equilibria (SPE). We show that when Nature's moves are atomless in the original game, public randomization does not enlarge the set of SPE...