Decentralized matching markets on the internet allow large numbers of agents to interact anonymously at virtually no … sell-side). This simple and intuitive learning process implements core allocations even though agents have no knowledge of …

The core cover of a TU-game is a superset of the core and equals the convex hull of its larginal vectors. A larginal … called compromise stable if the core is equal to the core cover, i.e. the core is the convex hull of the larginal vectors. In … larginal vector of the set is a core element, then the game is compromise stable. The first characterization of these sets is …

We consider decentralized one-to-one matching markets with myopic and farsighted agents. We study myopic …. Our results have several implications pertaining to core-stability and singleton stable sets, and yield numerous results …-to-one matching markets …

coalitions also their union is feasible. Properties of solutions (the core, the nucleolus, the prekernel and the Shapley value …