Showing 1 - 8 of 8
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003819703
Leveraging a combination of analytical frameworks and empirical assessments, this study investigates the effects of wait-for-free (WFF) pricing schemes on the monetization of serialized, pleasure-seeking digital content that has become increasingly pervasive in online platforms. WFF pricing is a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013239105
When firms competitively price discriminate, best-response functions may exhibit either best-response symmetry (firms' ranking of strong and weak markets coincide) or best-response asymmetry (one firm's strong market is another firm's weak market). It has been shown in Corts (1998) and many...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012951719
One of the perennial questions in the switching cost literature is whether switching costs enhance or harm firms' profits. In this paper, we ask what types of switching costs, among those that are commonly observed, enhance firm's profits provided that firms can i) endogenously influence the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013050966
The inherent dynamic competitiveness of the new economy brings about novel challenges to antitrust enforcements. We evaluate the appropriateness of the 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines in light of this new environment. We show that the Guidelines relies too heavily on market concentration...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012709542
This paper demonstrates that, under a set of weak assumptions, increased product differentiation will make it more difficult to sustain collusion when it is costly either to coordinate or to maintain collusion. These results contrast with the previous theoretical literature, which shows that, in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014070150
This paper shows that the bid rotation scheme in McAfee and McMillan (1992) is no longer optimal when negative externalities are involved among the bidders. The optimal collusive bidding scheme in such case involves partial sorting
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014070227
This paper studies an infinitely repeated auction when the stage game involves negative externalities among buyers, that is, a buyer is worse off if another rival wins the good rather than if nobody wins it. It is first shown in the stage game that a cartel must be more inclusive if it wishes to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014070228