We examine the strategic interaction in the market for physician services when the total budget for reimbursement is fixed. We show that this prospective payment system involves { compared to a fee-for-service remuneration system { a severe coordination problem, which potentially leads to the...

Health authorities are constantly searching for new ways to stabilise health expenditures. To explore this issue, we compared the costs generated by different types of medical practice in French general medicine: i.e. conventional (CM-GP), homeopathic (Ho-GP), or mixed (Mx-GP). Data from a...

We examine the strategic interaction in the market for physician services when the total budget for reimbursement is fixed. We show that this prospective payment system involves compared to a fee-for-service remuneration system a severe coordination problem, which potentially leads to the...

This paper analyses the potential costs and benefits from patient driven competition between GPs and specialists by comparing gate-keeping with direct access to specialist care. The two access rules are compared under fee-for-service and capitation, on their performance at minimizing both total...

The questions addressed in this paper are related to access rules to primary care services and the potential for patient driven competition between GPs and specialists. Most of the literature on the performance of primary care has dealt with reforming payment schemes, little attention being paid...

Intermediaries may bargain with several upstream providers on behalf of consumers who do not directly pay for consumption, such as an insurer bargaining with hospitals. We show that the common Nash- in-Nash solution, while useful for estimation, can predict Nash overpricing: prices that exceed...

This article examines the way in which the criminal law regulates medical practice through the medical exception to the law governing serious offences against the person. It looks at how new and controversial medical procedures (NCMPs) come to be covered (or not) by the medical exception, and...