A major shortcoming of the growing empirical work on asymmetric information is the inability to separately identify moral hazard from adverse selection. Abbring et. al. (2003) point out that dynamic insurance data can help here, by asking whether consumers have fewer claims when they are at a...

Although there is an increasing interest in index-based insurances in many developing countries, crop data scarcity hinders its implementation by forcing insurers to charge higher premiums. Expert knowledge has been considered a valuable information source to augment limited data in insurance...

In this paper we adapt a dynamic discrete choice model to examine the aggregated demand for single- and multi-year crop insurance contracts. We show that in a competitive insurance market with heterogeneous risk averse farmers, there is simultaneous demand for both insurance contracts. Moreover,...

This paper examines whether the loadings on the crop insurance premium rates for risks such as moral hazard and adverse selection are adequate. From the discrete choice (tobit) analysis conducted, we discover that the premium loadings for 75% coverage level are not adequate, resulting in losses...

Whether the agricultural insurance has positive impacts on the primary industry has been debated for decades of years. This paper studies this question based on the policy-based agricultural insurance implementation in 2007 in China. We conduct difference in difference analysis and event study...