It is shown that the equilibrium in the asymmetric Tullock contest is unique for parameter values r ≤ 2. This allows proving a revenue ranking result saying that a revenue-maximizing designer capable of biasing the contest always prefers a contest technology with higher accuracy.

Experimental studies show that the Nash equilibrium and its refinements are poor predictors of behavior in non-cooperative strategic games. Cooperation models, such as ERC and inequality aversion, yield superior predictions compared to the standard game theory predictions. However, those models...

This paper analyses a model of legislative bargaining in which parties form tentative coalitions (protocoalitions) before deciding on the allocation of a resource. Protocoalitions may fail to reach an agreement, in which case they may be dissolved (breakdown) and a new protocoalition may form....

This research states the stylised n (more than two) players' splitting problem as a mathematical programme, relying on definitions of the values of the game and problem stationarity to generate tractable reduced forms, and derives the known solutions according to the properties of pertaining...

We consider a standard coalitional bargaining game where once a coalition forms it exits as in Okada (2011), however, instead of alternating offers, we have simultaneous payoff demands. We focus in the producer game he studies. Each player is chosen with equal probability. If that is the case,...