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I study a situation where two players disagree on the division of a good. In the first of two stages, the players can divide the good peacefully between them by signing a contract. If either or both players reject the contract, they must engage in a costly contest over the good. One of the...
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We present a version of Baliga and Sjöström’s (2012a) conflict games with two asymmetric players. The players …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014093382
negotiations are frictionless. Thus, the Coase conjecture does not hold. We study how the minimum length of conflict depends on the …We study whether the Coase conjecture holds in a model of bargaining during conflict due to Powell and Fearon. Two … players, A and B, contest a divisible resource. At any time during the conflict, they can make a binding agreement to share …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014451286
The rise of a new power may lead the dominant power to seek a preventive war. We study this scenario in an experimental two-stage bargaining game. In each stage, the rising power makes a bargaining offer and the declining power must choose whether to accept it or fight. Between the two stages,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012801942
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We extend the Baron and Ferejohn (1989) model of multilateral bargaining by allowing the players to attempt commiting to a bargaining position prior to negotiating. If successful, commitment binds a player to reject any proposal which allocates to her a share below a self-imposed threshold. Any...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012176463
We theoretically investigate how the application of unanimity rule can lead to inefficient delay in collective decision making. We do so in the context of a distributive multilateral bargaining model featuring strategic pre-commitment. Prior to each bargaining round, players can declare a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014578010
protocol or a conflict to appropriate the surplus. In the cooperative negotiations, disagreement corresponds to a pro rata … which conflict will be preferred to negotiated agreements (and vice versa), and we derive welfare implications. Finally, we … their relative size on the profitability of negotiated agreements. -- Bargaining ; Conflict ; Agency Problem …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008747115