common belief in future rationality. The epistemic characterization we propose, although differently formulated, is …) counterfactuals. -- dynamic game ; imperfect information ; backward induction ; belief ; rationality ; behavioral model …

In [1], it was shown that in games of perfect information, common knowledge of rationality entails that the backward … of rationality that is weaker than (i.e., implied by) that of [1], common strong belief of rationality entails BI; as …

conflict. Barring indivisibilities or commitment problems, the literature finds that war can only occur between rational … whether B knows -- uncertainty about uncertainty. To ensure peace, then, states need not only know each other's attributes …

.We characterize the efficient sequential equilibria. We show that war is necessary to sustain peace and that temporary wars can emerge … their cost. The aggressive country can force concessions via war, and both countries suffer from limited commitment … patient, if the cost of war is large, and if the cost of concessions is low …