Showing 1 - 10 of 18
We study the design of profit maximizing single unit auctions under the assumption that the seller needs to incur costs to contact prospective bidders and inform them about the auction. With independent bidders’ types and possibly interdependent valuations, the seller’s problem can be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003780890
Existence of a monotone pure-strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium is proved for a multistage game of first-price auctions with interbidder resale, with any finite number of ex ante different bidders. Endogenous gains at resale complicate the winner's curse and upset previous fixed-point methods...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010360971
This paper analyzes simultaneous ascending auctions of two different items, viewed as complements by multi-item bidders. The finding is that such auctions overly concentrate the goods to a multi-item bidder and never overly diffuse them to single-item bidders. The main reason is that some...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003231637
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013367755
This paper analyzes simultaneous ascending auctions of two different items, viewed as complements by multi-item bidders. The finding is that such auctions overly concentrate the goods to a multi-item bidder and never overly diffuse them to single-item bidders. The main reason is that some...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010270348
We study the design of profit maximizing single unit auctions under the assumption that the seller needs to incur costs to contact prospective bidders and inform them about the auction. With independent bidders’ types and possibly interdependent valuations, the seller’s problem can be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010277294
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012236114
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005252485
A long-standing unsolved problem, often arising from auctions with multidimensional bids, is how to design seller-optimal auctions when bidders' private characteristics differ in many dimensions. This paper partially solves the problem in an auction setting with characteristics stochastically...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005328738
The English auction is susceptible to tacit collusion when post-auction inter-bidder resale is allowed. We show this by constructing equilibria where, with positive probability, one bidder wins the auction without any competition and divides the spoils by optimally reselling the good to the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968458