Fragile by Design suggests a unifying explanation for systematic differences across countries in the domestic supply of credit and the susceptibility of banking systems to failure. The centrepiece is a theory of “The Game of Bank Bargains” (“the Game”), which is played between bankers,...

This is my presidential address to the Economic History Association that was delivered in September 2020. It examines the failures or in some cases near-failures, of financial institutions that started the 12 most severe peacetime financial panics in the United States, beginning with the Panic...

The article explores the legislative and regulatory responses to the global financial crisis, from a US-EU comparative perspective, focusing on the measures dealing with banks' and financial intermediaries' distress. A dual-stage approach in both legal systems is identified: the first, aiming to...

This paper analyses the causes of banking crises by the way of a historical comparative casestudy. Moreover, the analysis draws on theories elaborated by the economist Hyman Minsky. The evidence presented suggests that the fundamental causes of the compared crises are found in the macroeconomic...