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Delegating budgets when agents care about autonomy

Kuhn, Michael (contributor) - 2004 - [Elektronische Ressource]

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002050615

Optimal delegated search with adverse selection and moral hazard

Ulbricht, Robert - 2014

The paper studies a model of delegated search. The distribution of search revenues is unknown to the principal and has to be elicited from the agent in order to design the optimal search policy. At the same time, the search process is unobservable, requiring search to be self-enforcing. The two...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010358239

Dynamic managerial compensation : on the optimality of seniority-based schemes

Garrett, Daniel F.; Pavan, Alessandro - 2014

We study the optimal dynamics of incentives for a manager whose ability to generate cash .ows changes stochastically with time and is his private information. We show that, in general, the power of incentives (or "pay for performance") may either increase or decrease with tenure. However, risk...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010476876

When trust fades... : can optimal mechanisms for policy decisions always be designed?

Major, Iván - 2013

Governments must usually take policy decisions with an imperfect knowledge of the economic actors' type or the actors' effort level. These issues are addressed within the framework of classic adverse selection or moral hazard models. I discuss in this paper how would the government’s and the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010211955

The management of talent for innovation : optimal contracting for selection and incentives

Foarta, Dana; Sugaya, Takuo - 2018

Optimally reallocating human capital to tasks is key for an organization to successfully navigate a transition. We … study how to design employment contracts to allocate employees to different valuable projects within an organization given … unobservable effort. The organization has two types of valuable projects, high and low impact, only the former of which requires …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011980048

The optimal contract under adverse selection in a moral-hazard model with a risk-averse agent

Maréchal, François; Thomas, Lionel - In: Games 9 (2018) 1/12, pp. 1-22

This paper studies the optimal contract offered by a risk-neutral principal to a risk-averse agent when the agent’s hidden ability and action both improve the probability of the project being successful. We show that if the agent is sufficiently prudent and able, the principal induces a higher...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011849217

Dynamic, incentive-compatible contracting for health services

Levaggi, Rosella; Moretto, Michele; Pertile, Paolo - 2023

This paper aims to characterise a dynamic, incentive-compatible contract for the provision of health services, allowing for both moral hazard and adverse selection. Patients' severity changes over time following a stochastic process and is private information of the provider. We characterise the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014342117

Optimal delegated search with adverse selection and moral hazard

Ulbricht, Robert - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 11 (2016) 1, pp. 253-278

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011672191

Information Acquisition and the Equilibrium Incentive Problem

Su, Alice Peng-Ju - 2017

I study the optimal incentive provision in a principal–agent relationship with costly information acquisition by the agent. I emphasize that adverse selection or moral hazard is the principal's endogenous choice by inducing or deterring information acquisition. The principal designs the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012960416

Optimal Task Scheduling under Moral Hazard & Adverse Selection

Agastya, Murali - 2019

A Principal owns a project consisting of several tasks. Tasks differ, both in their innate success probabilities and their incremental benefits. Moreover, specialists must be engaged to perform these tasks. Subject to moral hazard and adverse selection, in what order should the Principal...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012859420

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